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DOES COOPERATION REDUCE SERVICE DELIVERY COSTS? 
EVIDENCE FROM RESIDENTIAL SOLID WASTE SERVICES 
 
Abstract: The main objective of this work is to examine whether small municipalities can reduce 
costs through cooperation and delegation. We first examine factors explaining the decision of 
municipalities to cooperate and delegate service delivery responsibility, in this case residential 
solid waste services, to another government. Furthermore, we estimate the impact of cooperation 
on the costs of providing residential solid waste services. The empirical analysis is done using a 
sample of small Spanish municipalities. Results of the empirical analysis suggest that 
cooperation is a pragmatic choice for municipalities with a sub-optimal size: municipalities that 
cooperate by delegating face lower costs for residential solid waste services than those that do 
not. Furthermore, we find that cooperation allows municipalities to save costs once we control 
for the form of production and other factors explaining costs.  
Keywords: Privatization, cooperation, costs, solid waste. 
JEL codes: H4, H76, l32, L33 
 
 
0. Introduction 
Municipalities do not often coincide with the optimal scale for the delivery of services, and this 
mismatch can constrain decisions regarding how these services are to be provided. One means 
of reorganizing services in order to obtain returns to scale1 (economies of scale hereafter) is via 
the consolidation of governments, therefore by merging local jurisdictions. Such a process 
involves the merging of multiple jurisdictions, so that services are provided in an aggregate and 
                                                 
1
 Returns to scale is the generic denomination that includes economies of scale, economies of density and 
economies of scope (see Bel, forthcoming). These are different origins of costs savings that can eventually 
be obtained by means of reform of service delivery, and are associated with different characteristics of 
the service cost structure. From here on, we use only ‘economies of scale’ to avoid terminological 
confusion. 
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joint form. However, this formula has met with little success in general, although it has been 
adopted in countries such as Holland (Bel, Dijkgraaf, Fageda and Gradus, 2010) and Switzerland 
(Steiner, 2003). Contrary to a number of a priori expectations, empirical evidence of the 
economic effects suggests that consolidation is often accompanied by cost increases.2 
Alternatively, many municipalities with a suboptimal size for the production of local services 
resort to outsourcing in order to benefit from economies of scale (Donahue, 1989). Outsourcing 
can ensure cost savings because an optimal scale of production can be achieved by aggregating 
the production of multiple municipalities. Yet, according to recently published reviews of the 
empirical evidence, the results of privatization have not, in general, been as satisfactory as 
expected (Bel and Warner, 2008a, 2008b; Bel, Fageda and Warner, 2010).3  
One important issue is that of transaction costs derived from privatization, comprising 
administrative costs of the contracting process, costs of monitoring the service under private 
production, and costs incurred from incomplete contracts. Transaction costs are relevant (Brown 
and Potoski, 2003a, 2003b, 2005) and can, on occasion, even exceed the cost savings associated 
with the exploitation of scale economies. These costs may be particularly relevant in smaller 
municipalities because administrative and monitoring costs are themselves subject to scale 
economies. Because of this, transaction costs associated with the privatization of services may 
be greater than any benefits it might provide (Bel and Miralles, 2003). This could be particularly 
the case of small municipalities, which would make private production less attractive for them. 
Furthermore, as the availability of private providers is not as high in smaller municipalities 
as in large cities (Warner and Hefetz, 2003; Bel and Fageda, 2011), the likelihood of privatization 
occurring is lower (Lamothe, Lamothe and Feiock, 2008). Thus, in the least populated 
                                                 
2
 Allers and Geertsema (2012) review most empirical studies that have analyzed the effect of 
consolidation on costs. 
3
 Disappointment regarding expected results from privatization has triggered debate and scholarly 
analysis on reverse privatization (i.e. Hefetz and Warner, 2004). 
3 
 
municipalities the frequency of private production is lower than it is in their more heavily 
populated counterparts, as has been described by Bel and Miralles (2003) and Bel (2006) for 
Spain, and Warner (2006) for the U.S. 
Still another available reform intended to benefit from economies of scale is inter-municipal 
cooperation. Our main goal is to examine whether small municipalities can reduce costs through 
cooperation and delegation. In various European countries, local authorities have opted to work 
with their neighboring municipalities in inter-municipal cooperation schemes that aggregate the 
production of services in a number of different municipalities. Inter-municipal cooperation is 
now widespread in Western Europe (Hulst and van Montfort, 2007) and in Eastern and Central 
Europe as well (Swianiewicz, 2011).4  
The same is true in Spain, whose democratization and decentralization in the 1980s 1990s 
sparked scholarly interest in local and intergovernmental service delivery throughout the country 
(Agranoff, 2010). In Spain, inter-municipal cooperation does not usually involve municipal 
governments contracting out the service to another government or public agency. Instead, 
municipal governments engage in cooperation under a joint authority (either a supra-municipal 
institution at the comarca/county or province level, or a single purpose agency such as 
Mancomunidades) in which all involved governments play a governance role. Within the context 
of our analysis, we frame cooperation as the decision of the municipality to delegate or transfer 
the responsibility of the service to the comarca/county, which is considered an inter-municipal 
unit (as in Agranoff, 2010, p. 107). It is important to note that inter-municipal cooperation in our 
context differs from the formal inter-municipal agreements typical of the United States, since in 
the latter case the agreement is most frequently a contract assigning responsibility for the service 
to just one of the municipalities (Holzer and Fry, 2011). As such, the system operated might be 
                                                 
4
 In England, however, there are few examples of horizontal cooperation among local authorities 
reflecting a range of historical and political factors (Kelly, 2007). 
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seen as inter-municipal contracting. However, other types of inter-municipal cooperation exist, 
such as horizontal production arrangements with other governments (see Feiock and Scholz, 
2010).  
The factors influencing inter-municipal contracting have been extensively studied for the 
US: Warner and Hebdon (2001) analyze inter-municipal cooperation as one of the available 
alternatives to privatization. Warner and Hefetz (2002) find that smaller cities are more likely to 
cooperate with larger local governments to gain economies of scale.  In the same way, Carr, 
LeRoux and Shrestha (2009) find cooperation negatively related to population. Other studies on 
factors influencing interlocal cooperation by LeRoux (2007) and LeRoux, Brandenburger and 
Pandey (2010) find that fiscal and wealth reasons do not seem to play a role, other city and 
regional characteristics might be influential, and social networks might be as well. In a more 
recent study, Shrestha and Feiock (2011) analyze interlocal agreement of different types, 
typically either pay-for-service (contracting to another government) or co-financing production 
arrangements with other local governments. They empirically study cities’ service delivery mode 
choice and level of interlocal cooperation across multiple services, and find that interlocal 
cooperation is shaped by the nature and the degree of transaction risks as well as by reciprocal 
exchange relationships. Finally, Hefetz and Warner (2012) emphasize the role cooperation can 
play in services when competition is low, and Hefetz, Warner and Vigoda-Gadot (2012) find 
that cooperation is negatively related to population and more frequent in non-metrocore areas. 
Today, local service operations in general and residential solid waste services in particular 
are delivered under conditions of fiscal constraint. Thus, it has become increasingly important 
to know how municipalities manage their local services. Empirical evidence is widely available 
at the local level, but very few studies have analyzed this problem for small municipalities, which 
typify many of Spain’s regions (as in France and Italy). In our context, we define small 
municipalities as those below 5,000 inhabitants. In fact, this is lowest threshold established by 
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Spanish legislation to define the type of services for which municipalities are responsible. 
Medium-size municipalities are those with populations between 5,000 and 20,000, and large 
municipalities are those with populations above 20,000 inhabitants.  
In this paper, we first analyze factors explaining the decision of municipalities to cooperate 
and delegate the responsibility of residential solid waste services to the supra-municipal level. 
Then, we examine the determinants of the costs of providing solid waste services for a sample 
of small municipalities, including explanatory variables related to the form of provision -
municipal or supra-municipal level-, and also whether the delivery of the service is public or 
private. The empirical analysis takes into account the possible endogeneity bias due to the 
simultaneous determination of costs and cooperation.  
Our main goal is to examine whether small municipalities can reduce costs through 
cooperation and delegation, as mentioned. We do so by controlling for the form of production. 
This analysis is important because modes of service delivery matter not only about what modes 
cities prefer and why, but also about what mode of delivery is more efficient than other. 
Several studies have analyzed the impact of privatization on the costs of residential solid 
waste services, but the literature on the impact of inter-municipal cooperation on costs is scarce. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first empirical multivariate analysis that examines the 
impact of cooperation on costs, taking into account the simultaneous determination of costs and 
the decision to cooperate or not, and controlling for production form as well. This allows us to 
explicitly address whether cooperation is effective at reducing costs. In this way, we provide 
useful implications for policy reform of local public services. The lessons we draw from our 
analysis can be of particular interest to countries were regional governments exist and encompass 
multiple small municipalities (e.g. like counties in the United States).To carry out the empirical 
analysis, a survey was designed and conducted among municipalities with over 1,000 inhabitants 
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in the Spanish region of Aragon, which is characterized by the small number of inhabitants in 
most of its municipalities.   
The rest of our paper is structured as follows. In the first section, we review previous research 
examining the relationship between the costs of local service delivery and cooperation. In the 
second section, we describe the institutional framework and data relevant to our analysis. In the 
third section, we characterize aour empirical strategy. In the fourth section, we discuss our 
estimation strategies and report our results. The final section concludes the paper by identifying 
the implications of our empirical analysis.  
1. Cooperation and costs 
Many publicly provided goods are characterized by the existence of economies of scale, which 
poses a problem regarding the optimal scale for the service. Since the early seventies, economists 
and political scientists have analyzed the optimal size of a municipality for the provision of local 
services (Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren, 1961; Oates, 1972; Mirrless, 1972; Dixit, 1973). Of 
particular interest within our context is the work by Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren (1961, pp. 835-
837) on the scale problem in public organizations, and particularly the criterion of efficiency 
regarding the appropriated boundaries within which a public good should be provided and 
produced. In this way, whenever the jurisdiction’s boundary does not match the optimal 
boundary, “the most efficient solution would require the modification of boundary conditions so 
as to assure a producer of public goods and services the most favorable economy of scale, as 
well as effective control” (p. 835). In the same direction, Donahue (1989) points out that the size 
of the municipality is not optimal in terms of production. Therefore, it is technically more 
efficient to reduce the number of companies operating in that market or even, in extreme cases 
where economies of scale are of great importance, to have just one company provide the entire 
service.  
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Hence, one of the main motives for privatizing a local service could be the reduction achieved 
in costs through economies of scale. As the size of the smallest municipalities is not optimal for 
the production of certain services, outsourcing can allow an optimal scale of production to be 
achieved. Given that the external producer is not limited to operating in a single city (that is, 
within a suboptimal boundary), the production of several municipalities can be conjoined 
together and, as a result, cost savings can occur. For these reasons, the realization of economies 
of scale through outsourcing can potentially create high welfare gains.5  
Since Hirsch’s (1965) pioneering econometric analysis, the relationship between the costs of 
solid waste services and the production form has been discussed in numerous articles. Some of 
these works (i.e. Stevens 1978, Dubin and Navarro 1988) have laid out the main theoretical 
issues, testable hypotheses and technical tools that frame the analysis on the relationship between 
solid waste costs and production form. After almost five decades of empirical analysis on the 
subject, most recent and comprehensive metaliterary reviews (Bel and Warner, 2008a) and 
metaregression analysis (Bel, Fageda and Warner, 2010) find no systematic differences of 
delivery costs between private and public production. 
An alternative solution to privatization can be that formulated by Ostrom, Tiebout and 
Warren (1961, p. 836) when they suggest that small municipalities can make use of special 
arrangements to act jointly to provide services when the municipal boundary is suboptimal. The 
aggregation of solid waste services through inter-municipal cooperation also facilitates the 
exploitation of economies of scale. Based on this we formulate a testable first hypothesis (H1): 
                                                 
5
 The lack of competition in public production results in average costs that suffer from inefficiency. The 
introduction of competition through auction encourages cost minimization, resulting in technical 
efficiency. Inter-municipal economies of scale also lead to lower average costs for the overall market 
winner. However, in some cases, problems of competition arise in the designation of the contract; in 
others, there is a trend towards the concentration of private producers (Bel and Costas, 2006; Bel and 
Fageda, 2011) which may result in local service privatization failing to achieve cost savings. 
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Inter-municipal provision (cooperation) is associated with lower delivery costs than individual 
provision 
In this regard, Bel and Costas (2006), Bel and Mur (2009) and Zafra-Rodriguez et al. 
(forthcoming) extend the analyses on costs of solid waste services by considering inter-municipal 
cooperation. The outcomes reported in Bel and Costas (2006) indicate that municipal 
cooperation reduces costs6 and support the hypothesis of Kodrzycki (1994) and Ballard and 
Warner (2000) that cost savings derived from outsourcing tend to diminish over time, and that 
the earlier the first recruitment experience in a municipality, the greater the competition will be 
and the more marked the effect on lowering service costs. Bel and Mur’s (2009) results point to 
the existence of lower costs in the presence of cooperation, especially among smaller 
municipalities (less than 5,000 inhabitants). Overall, the average cost in the cooperating 
municipalities is 25% less than the average costs in those that do not cooperate. Zafra-Rodriguez 
et al. (forthcoming) also find cooperation to be associated with lower costs. 
Nevertheless, inter-municipal cooperation is not exempt from problems because the cost 
effective choice of organization varies systematically with the attributes of transactions 
(Williamson, 1991). Transaction costs result from service characteristics, city characteristics, 
institutional design and organizational arrangements (Frederickson and Smith 2003, Feiock 
2007). Sörensen (2007), in the case of Norway, and Garrone, Grilli and Rousseau (forthcoming), 
in the case of Italy, have studied inter-municipal cooperation. In these countries, the 
organizations responsible for managing municipal cooperation are multi-governmental agencies 
that risk aggravating principal-agent problems by increasing the distance between local 
government and the executive in charge of production. In addition, they weaken the incentives 
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 Interestingly, the outcomes reported by Bel and Costas (2006) show that cooperation is negatively 
related to costs for estimates of the aggregate equation and estimates that include municipalities with 
populations up to 10,000 and 20,000 inhabitants. By contrast, this variable is not significantly different 
from zero in the estimate for municipalities with a larger population (over 20,000 inhabitants). 
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to oversee the system because of the dispersion of ownership, resulting in a reduction in the 
efficiency of production. 
Likewise, Garrone, Grilli and Rousseau’s (forthcoming) results show that the main source of 
inefficiency originates from the discretional nature of management. More specifically, cost 
efficiency is positively related to the entry of external directors to the board, and to the 
concentration in municipal ownership. From a political standpoint, their results indicate the 
importance of governance issues in the restructuring of public services.  
Up until here, we have considered the distinction between collaborative provision (inter-
municipal level) and individual provision (municipal level). But we need to pay attention as well 
to a second dimension that is important in our context, given that the comarcas/counties can 
make use of either public or private production.7 Recall that 'cooperation or individual' relates to 
the question on who provides the services, whereas 'public or private' relates to the question on 
who produces the service.  
Within the production form dimension, there are some important issues that particularly 
concern small-sized municipalities. On the one hand, the availability of private providers is lower 
in smaller towns and in areas with lower population levels, which are precisely the places where 
there is potential for greater economies of scale (Warner and Hefetz, 2003; Bel and Fageda, 
2008, 2011), and this lower availability of private providers is associated with a lower likelihood 
of privatization (Lamothe, Lamothe and Feiock, 2008) and bigger risk of competition failure 
(Bel and Fageda 2011). 
 On the other hand, the transaction costs that small municipalities bear as a result of 
privatization may outweigh the potential benefits of privatization (Bel and Miralles, 2003). 
                                                 
7
 In Spain, cooperation is compatible with privatization (Bel, 2006a; Bel and Fageda, 2008). In other 
countries such as Netherlands (Bel, Dijkgraaf, Fageda and Gradus, 2010) and Norway (Sörensen, 2007), 
cooperation takes place in a situation of public production. 
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Instead, cooperation may be subject to lower transaction costs than privatization because 
cooperating governments share similar objectives (Brown 2008), share similar theories of action 
(Kirk, Nabatchi and Balogh, 2012), and trust is higher for other governments than for private 
vendors (Lamothe and Lamothe, forthcoming). Therefore, with inter-municipal provision, 
privatization does not have the comparative advantage (with respect to inter-municipal 
cooperation) of allowing the municipalities the opportunity to benefit from scale economies, 
which they cannot do with individual provision. Furthermore, transaction costs for small 
municipalities are likely to be higher with private production than with public production. Based 
on this, we formulate a testable second hypothesis (H2): With inter-municipal provision 
(cooperation), public production is associated with lower costs than private production. 
The factors discussed above may explain why, contrary to expectations, the frequency of 
privatization in towns with smaller populations is lower than in cities with medium and large 
populations, as shown by Bel and Miralles (2003) and Bel (2006) for Spain, and Warner (2006) 
for the US. Instead, small municipalities engage more frequently in inter-municipal cooperation. 
In spite of this, empirical analysis focusing on small municipalities is scarce in the literature. Our 
empirical analysis contributes to fill this gap in the literature.  
2. Institutional framework and Data 
2.a Institutional framework 
Spain’s National Law 7/1985 establishes that municipal governments are responsible for the 
provision of residential solid waste services to citizens. However, the law does not specify how 
these services are to be delivered.  Under Spanish legal tradition, this means that municipalities 
are free to choose the delivery form. As such, they are free to engage in cooperation with other 
municipalities in order to share delivery and can choose delegate the provision of the service to 
different government levels.  
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Several Spanish regions, including Aragon which is the subject of our analysis, have created 
supra-municipal jurisdictions (comarcas, still of local type) that can provide municipal services 
when municipalities have delegated provision. In the particular case of Aragon, the comarcas –
or counties- were created by the regional laws of 1993 and 1996. These laws assigned each 
municipality to a specific county. These laws also provided municipalities the freedom to retain 
the provision of a service at the municipal level, or alternatively they can transfer the 
responsibility to the county. In the case of delegation, members of councils from each 
municipality participate in governance decisions within the county government, so decisions 
regarding the choice of the production require the cooperative decision making of the 
participating municipalities.8 At any time, municipalities can revoke the delegation of service 
provision to the county. Nonetheless, while the service is delegated, comarcas are a strong central 
coordinating body, which is a requirement for effective service delivery networks according to 
Milward and Provan (2000). 
Under this cooperative arrangement, the choice is made to use private production, public 
production or mixed firms for delivery. In Aragon, the region for which we conduct our exercise, 
several comarcas use public production to deliver solid waste, and other comarcas choose to 
contract out to private firms. In others regions, such as Catalonia, some comarcas make also use 
of mixed public-private firms for service delivery.9  
Hence, inter-municipal cooperation can be used as as an alternative to privatization to exploit 
scale economies (Bel and Costas, 2006; Bel and Fageda, 2008), allowing the aggregation of the 
service at the local level and offering the possibility of realizing economies of scale with lower 
transaction costs. Note, however, that inter-municipal cooperation in Spain is also compatible 
                                                 
8
 Bel, Dijkgraaf, Fageda and Gradus (2010) provide information on how local supramunicial governments 
in Spain are formed. 
9
 A detailed comparison of organizational formulas used for service delivery in the US and Spain can be 
found in Warner and Bel (2008). 
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with the privatization of the services (Bel, 2006; Bel and Fageda, 2008). Recall that scale 
economies is only one among several factors that induce local public services privatization (Bel 
and Fageda 2007, 2009). Because of this some comarcas may prefer using private firms for 
service delivery even if they have already addressed economies of scale by means of a 
cooperative arrangement. In cases where cooperation is used for joint purchase from private 
firms (rather than for joint production), the transaction costs associated with the privatization 
process are shared by the cooperating municipalities.  
2.b Data 
To carry out our empirical analysis, a survey was designed and administered to municipalities 
with more than 1,000 inhabitants in the Spanish region of Aragon. The data refer to the year 
2008, the latest available at the time of the survey. Information regarding costs was obtained 
from this survey, as was that related to the means of production, ownership of the service, and 
the availability of a landfill in the municipality. Complete information was obtained from 85 
municipalities. 66 of these 85 municipalities have less than 5000 inhabitants, while only 12 have 
more than 10.000 inhabitants. Thus, a very high proportion of municipalities in our sample can 
be considered small municipalities. An analysis of the representativeness of this sample shows 
that the coverage is around 80% of all the municipalities with more than 1000 inhabitants in 
Aragon.  
Information regarding population and municipal size was provided by the National Institute 
of Statistics (http://www.ine.es). Information on local dispersion is published on the website of 
the Aragonese Institute of Statistics (http://portal.aragon.es).   
The information needed to calculate the municipal financial burden, the mayor’s political 
party, and the county president’s political party was gathered from the website of the 
Government of Aragón (http://servicios.aragon.es/portalAALL/home.do). For fiscal and 
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political variables, we have been able to obtain information for just 80 municipalities. Table 1 
shows the descriptive statistics for the model’s variables.  
Table 2 shows the characteristics of the sample of municipalities for the different service 
delivery modes. Note, first and foremost, that the levels of outsourcing and cooperation in solid 
waste services in Aragon are very high. In fact, the level of outsourcing to private companies in 
the region (66%) can be seen as representative of the Spanish market, where private firms deliver 
solid waste collection in around 60% of the municipalities (Bel, 2006; Bel and Fageda 2008). 
On the contrary, inter-municipal cooperation is very frequent in Aragon (88% of the 
municipalities in the sample). This is much higher than in the Spanish market as a whole, where 
around of 40% of the municipalities cooperate, percentage that grows until 52% if we take only 
into account municipalities between 2,000 and 10,000 inhabitants in Spain (Bel, 2006).10 
 
                                                 
10
 As mentioned, we drop five cases in the sample used for the estimation because we have not been able 
to find data for fiscal and political variables. Four of these five cases fit in the category of joint purchase 
from the market, while 1 of the cases fit in the category of bilateral purchase from the market. We do not 
expect these dropped cases to have substantial impact on the results because the category of joint purchase 
from the market is the more frequent in our final sample of municipalities.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the model’s variables  
Source: authors’ own  
 
 
Table 2. Characteristics of municipalities according to the form of delivery (average values) 
 Inter-municipal 
cooperation 
(N=26) 
Joint purchase from 
the market  
(N=49) 
In-house 
production 
 (N=3) 
Bilateral purchase 
from the market 
(N=7) 
Total costs (CTE) 197060.6 100099.6 748663.2 256007.3 
Costs per capita 31.7 33.5 40.04 47.8 
Population (POP) 6066.1 3131.8 17660 7200 
Density of 
population (DEN) 
53.1 67.1 40.9 171.6 
Dispersion (DISP) 4.5 2.7 5.6 3.4 
Distance to the 
landfill (DIST) 
26.3 40.6 13.6 27.3 
Note: Data for all the variables refer to 2008. 
 
 
 
Continuous Variables Average Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum N 
CTE (total 
expenditures in euro) 
165488.2 296879 11970.48 1991663 85 
POP (Number of 
inhabitants) 
4877.1 7469.5 871 51117 85 
DISP (number of 
neighbors in the 
municipality) 
3.4 5.1 1 33 85 
DEN (number of 
inhabitants per square 
kilometer) 
70.4 140.9 6.1 958.5 85 
DIST (distance to the 
landfill in kilometers) 
34.23 20.4 0 76 85 
CFCRA (Index of 
financial burden) 
0.08 0.09 1.83e-06 0.57 80 
Discrete variables Number 
observations 1 
Number 
observations 0 
  
D Delegation (cooperation =1) 75 10  85 
Dprivatization(private production =1) 56 29  85 
Dinter-municipal cooperation (public production 
with cooperation =1) 
26 59  85 
Djoint purchase from the market (private 
production with cooperation =1) 
49 36  85 
Din-house production (public production with 
no cooperation) 
3 82  85 
Dbilateral purchase from the market (1= private 
production with no cooperation) 
7 78  85 
DPol(mayor right-wing  =1) 41 39  80 
DMunicipality_county(same party major- 
chair of the county =1) 
52 28  80 
15 
 
At the same time, it also appears that population is much higher in the municipalities that 
decided not to delegate the service, even though per capita costs are also higher in these 
municipalities. By contrast, the population is higher in those municipalities with public 
production than it is in those with private production. Given the choice of cooperate or not, costs 
per capita are higher for municipalities with private production. 
Table A1 in the appendix shows data about the characteristics of the municipalities that 
cooperate. As expected, the population of the capital of the county is usually much higher than 
that of the rest of municipalities in the county.  All municipalities that cooperate and are not the 
capital of the county have less than 5000 inhabitants and we can find several examples of 
municipalities with less than 2000 inhabitants. Thus, it is clear that municipalities that cooperate 
are characterized by a very small size. Distance to the capital of the county is generally lower 
than 30 kilometers, although we can find some few examples of municipalities that cooperate 
and that are about 40 kilometers away from the capital. Overall, it seems that the municipality 
needs to be located relatively close to the capital in order to transfer the responsibility of the 
service to the county. 
3. The empirical strategy  
In this section, we first analyze factors explaining the decision to delegate and cooperate or not, 
that is to say, the decision to delegate to the county the responsibility for residential solid waste 
services. Then, we study the determinants of the costs of providing solid waste services for a 
sample of small municipalities.  
Regarding the decision to cooperate or not, we estimate the following equation: 
DDelegation= β0 + β1CTEi + β2POPi + β3DISPi + β4CFCRAi + β5DPoli  +  β8DMunicipality_countyi + εi                                                                                                                
                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
(1)
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The dependent variable in this equation is a dummy variable that takes the value one for those 
municipalities that have chosen to delegate the responsibility of the service to the county, 
DDelegation. Thus, this variable takes the value one for those observations where the production 
form is inter-municipal cooperation or joint purchase of the market, and it takes the value zero 
in other cases. These are the explanatory variables included in our equation of factors explaining 
the decision to delegate the production of the service to the county: 
1) The total costs paid for solid waste services in the municipalities of Aragon, CTE. These 
costs include expenditures covering collection, transport, disposal/self-disposal and treatment. 
With this variable, we want to test whether municipalities may choose to delegate the 
responsibility of the service to the county in order to save costs. If this is the case, municipalities 
that afford higher costs in delivering the service may choose to transfer the responsibility of the 
service to the supra-municipal level. Thus, we expect a positive sign in the coefficient associated 
to this variable.  
2) Population of the municipality, POP. As a proxy for output we take the population of the 
municipality, according to the 2008 municipal register of inhabitants.11 A negative relationship 
is expected between population and the decision to delegate the delivery of the service at the 
supra-municipal level, consistent with results in Warner and Hefetz (2002), Bel and Costas 
(2006), Bel and Fageda (2008), and Shrestha and Feiock (2011). A major motivation for a 
municipalitity to cooperate with other municipalities has to do with the economies of scale. 
Larger municipalities may be able to exploit scale economies by themselves, while small 
localities may have a suboptimal size for the production of the service. 
                                                 
11
 We do not have enough data for the amount of solid wasted treated in each municipality. Using 
population as a proxy for waste output has been done in several studies (i.e. Kitchen, 1976; Bel and Mur, 
2009), and other studies use different proxies when lacking data on waste output (Hirsch, 1965; Pier, 
Vernon and Wicks, 1974; Kemper and Quigley, 1976; Domberger, Meadowcroft and Thompson, 1986; 
Szymanski and Wilkins, 1993; Reeves and Barrow, 2000; and Dijkgraaf and Gradus 2003). 
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3) Municipal dispersion, DISP. Controlling for costs, greater dispersion of the municipality 
increase the complexity of supervision by the local government. Indeed, greater dispersion 
makes more difficult to ensure that the service is properly provided, thus increasing transaction 
costs from cooperation. Transaction cost are negatively related to cooperation (Shrestha and 
Feiock, 2011), thus dispersion could spur the local government to maintain the provision of the 
service within the own jurisdiction. Thus, the expected effect of the variable of dispersion on the 
likelihood of cooperation is negative.  
4) Index of financial burden, CFCRA. Financial conditions have been considered when 
analyzing the cooperation decision, as in Shrestha and Feiock (2011). A municipality’s financial 
difficulties may constitute a decisive factor in the decision to the delegate the delivery of the 
service, especially in small municipalities. We built this variable as the ratio of debt costs 
(interest plus amortization) and current revenue12 (Chapter I to V of income). 
5) A dummy variable that takes the value one when the political ideology of the mayor is 
right-wing, DPol. With this variable, we are aimed to show if local politicians who decide to 
delegate the delivery of the service can be influenced by ideological criteria.  As the decision 
whether to cooperate should be a pragmatic decision (as it usually is the privatization decision –
see Bel and Fageda, 2007, 2009), the expected effect for the coefficient associated with this 
variable is not clear. 13 
6) A dummy variable that takes the value one when the mayor of the municipality is of the 
same party that the chair of the county, DMunicipality_county. We expect that municipalities run by 
the same political party as that governing the county are more likely to delegate the delivery of 
                                                 
12
 In accordance with the Ley Reguladora de las Haciendas Locales, that states that the sum of 
depreciation plus interest on debt cannot exceed 25 per cent of the Region’s current revenues. 
13
 Thus, we consider a mayor's party ideology to be left-wing if she belongs to the Partido Socialista 
Obrero Español (PSOE), Izquierda Unida (IU) or Chunta Aragonesista; and right-wing if she belongs to 
the Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD), Partido Popular (PP, formerly People's Alliance) or Partido 
Aragonés (PAR). 
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the service to this supra-municipal entity. Thus, we expect a positive sign in the coefficient 
associated to this variable.  
Along with the factors explaining the decision to delegate or not, we want to examine 
whether municipalities save costs by delegating the service to the county once we control for the 
form of production. It is also of interest to identify the different relationship that both private 
production and cooperation may have on the costs of providing the solid waste service. Ideally, 
this would allow us to identify the most effective way (private production or cooperation) to 
organize the provision of this service so as to maximize cost savings. However, we do not have 
enough data to provide a clear answer to the question of whether cooperation is more effective 
than privatization in saving costs. Still, we estimate two different cost equations in order to 
disentangle the impact of cooperation on costs by controlling for whether the service is delivered 
directly or through a contract:  
CTEi = β0 + β1DDelegationi + β2Dprivatizationi + β3POPi  + β4DISPi  + β5DENi  +  β6DISTi + εi              (2) 
CTEi = β0 + β1Dinter-municipal cooperationi + β2Djoint purcharse from the marketi + β3Din-house productioni  + β4POPi  +   
            + β5DISPi  + β6DENi  +  β7DISTi + εi                                                                                                                   (3) 
The dependent variable in both cost equations (CTE) represents the total costs paid for solid 
waste services in the municipalities of Aragon, and includes expenditure covering collection, 
transport, disposal/self-disposal and treatment. 
In equation (2), we include as explanatory variables a dummy variable that takes the value 
one when the municipality chooses to delegate the responsibility of the service (DDelegation) and a 
dummy variable that takes the value one when the service in the municipality is provided by a 
private firm through a contract (Dprivatization). Indeed, the variable of delegation takes the value 
one when the production form is inter-municipal cooperation or joint purchase from the market, 
while it takes value zero in other cases. The variable of privatization takes the value one when 
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the production form is joint or bilateral purchase from the market, and zero in other cases. With 
this equation, we are able to examine whether cooperation implies lower costs controlling for 
the form of production.  
In equation (3), we include variables for the following service delivery choices: a) Dummies 
for municipalities that cooperate with public production, Dinter-municipal cooperation,
 
and
 
for 
municipalities that cooperate with private production, Djoint purcharse from the market. b) Dummy for 
municipalities that not cooperate with public production, Din-house production. The reference case in 
this regression is the alternative of not cooperating with private production (bilateral purchase 
from the market). With this latter equation, we can compare whether cooperation is more 
effective than privatization in saving costs. However, the low number of observations for some 
of these service delivery choices makes advisable to proceed with the estimation of the cost 
equation with two different estimation techniques (2SLS and OLS respectively). Note, in this 
regard, that we have just three municipalities in our sample that has chosen public production 
with no cooperation (in-house production).  
The empirical literature suggests, as discussed above, that inter-municipal cooperation may 
be seen as an alternative (albeit compatible) to privatization for smaller municipalities with fewer 
potential external contractors (Warner and Hefetz, 2002, 2003; Bel and Costas 2006). 
Municipalities are expected to cooperate in order to reduce costs; therefore, a priori, the expected 
effect of the variables for municipalities that cooperate is negative. On the contrary, in the most 
recent and most robust empirical studies no differences between public and private production 
have been found. Thus, the expected effect of the form of production (public or private) is 
undetermined.  
The focus of our analysis is on the impact of cooperation and privatization on costs. Taken 
this into account, we consider the following control variables in both cost equations: 
20 
 
1) Population of the municipality, POP. As a proxy for output we take the population of the 
municipality. We expect a positive relationship between population and total costs. In fact, this 
variable should have the greatest impact on the explanatory power of the model. Note also that 
this variable captures the economies of scale of individual cities. 
2) Distance to the closest landfill, DIST. Total costs should be higher when distance to the 
landfill increases (Callan and Thomas, 2001; Bel and Costas, 2006). Thus, we expect a positive 
coefficient for the relationship between the landfill and the costs of the service. 
3) Municipal density, DEN. Previous empirical studies frequently use the number of 
dwellings in relation to the area of the municipality as an explanatory variable. However, the 
lack of up to date figures for this variable in Aragon means we have used the number of 
inhabitants per square kilometer as our indicator of “population density". On the one hand, 
increasing population density leads to a rise in the amount of waste collected at each stop, which 
in principle should reduce collection costs. However, on the other hand, a higher concentration 
of population leads to more traffic congestion and so increased travel time could cause costs to 
rise. Previous results on population density have been ambiguous (Kitchen, 1976; Domberger et 
al., 1986; Dubin and Navarro, 1988; Callan and Thomas, 2001; Bel and Costas 2006). Therefore, 
the final effect of the DEN variable is a priori undetermined. 
4) Municipal dispersion, DISP. A large number of villages within a municipal area may 
increase service costs because of the greater distances involved in providing the service (Bel and 
Miralles, 2003; Fluvià, Rigall i Torrent and Garriga, 2008). Therefore, the DISP variable is 
expected to have a positive effect on costs. Note that the variables of population density and 
dispersion are both related to transportation costs of delivering the service. However, they are 
measuring different attributes of the municipality since the variable of dispersion has to do with 
the number of villages regardless of the amount of population of each of these villages.  
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4. Estimation and results 
There may be a simultaneous determination of costs and the decision to cooperate. In this regard, 
the estimation technique must take into account the potential bias due to the inclusion of 
endogenous explanatory variables. Indeed, the cost variable may be endogenous in the equation 
for factors explaining cooperation and the cooperation variable may be endogenous in the cost 
equation. That is to say, the decision to cooperate or not can be dependent on costs (among other 
factors), and costs can be dependent on the provision/production form (among other factors).  
In such a case, these explanatory variables may be correlated with the error term so that one 
of the basic conditions to validate the ordinary least squares estimator (OLS) or a standard probit 
model is not met. The standard solution to the potential bias that comes from endogenous 
explanatory variables is to apply an instrumental variables procedure where the endogenous 
explanatory variable is estimated in a first step using exogenous instruments and the estimated 
(rather than actual) values of the endogenous variable are included in the equation of interest.14 
Hence, we apply a two-state procedure in the estimation of equations (1) and (2).  
Unfortunately, we are not able to apply a two-stage procedure in the estimation of equation 
(3) because we do not have enough instruments for the endogenous explanatory variables. The 
estimation of equation (3) was undertaken using the ordinary-stage least squares estimator. 
The two-stage procedure in the estimation of equation (1) is as follows. First, we estimate an 
equation that has the total costs as the dependent variable and includes as independent variables 
the exogenous explanatory variables of the equation and additional instruments for the variable 
of costs. The additional instruments must be correlated with the instrumented variable and not 
correlated with the error term. We can find the instruments in equation (2); (i) Distance to the 
                                                 
14
 The instruments are variables correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable that must be 
exogenous (ie; not correlated with the error term).   
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closest landfill (DIST), (ii) Municipal density (DEN). In the second stage, we estimate equation 
(1) using a probit with instrumental variables where the values of the variable of costs are those 
obtained from the estimation in the first stage.  
The two-stage procedure in the estimation of equation (2) is as follows. First, we estimate an 
equation that has the dummy variable for cooperation as the dependent variable and includes as 
independent variables the exogenous explanatory variables of the equation and additional 
instruments of the dummy variable for cooperation. Again the instruments can be found in 
equation (1); (i) Index of financial burden (CFCRA), (ii) A dummy variable that takes the value 
one when the political ideology of the mayor is right-wing (DPol), (iii) A dummy variable that 
takes the value one when the mayor of the municipality is of the same party that the chair of the 
county (DMunicipality_county). In the second stage, we estimate equation (2) using the two-stage least 
squares where the values of the dummy variable of cooperation are those obtained from the 
estimation in the first stage.  
All data for the variables used in the empirical analysis refer to 2008. Hence, we estimate a 
cross-sectional model. Standard deviations of the error term were robust to any problem of 
heteroscedasticity by applying White standard errors, and clusters were used at the provincial 
level (NUTS 3) in order to take into account the possible correlation between observations for 
municipalities in the same province. Unfortunately, we do not have enough observations to apply 
clusters at the county level. If we do that, most of variables lose its statistical significance. Note 
that the computed Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) indicates that our cost regression does not 
have a problem of multicollineality. The VIF obtained in the equation of factors explaining 
cooperation is higher because of the correlation between the variables of population and total 
costs, although. , this correlation does not alter the statistical significance of both variables.  
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Table 3 shows the results of the equation for the factors explaining cooperation, while table 4 
shows the results of the two estimated cost equations.  
 
Table 3. Empirical results of the estimation of the determinants of cooperation (probit with 
instrumental variables) 
 Dependent variable: Ddelegation 
CTE 0.00012 (1.13e-06)*** 
POP -0.0004 (0.000024)*** 
DISP -0.11 (0.02)*** 
CFCRA -0.48 (0.59) 
DPol -0.16 (0.10) 
DMunicipality_county 0.39 (0.18)** 
CONSTANT 0.56 (0.08) 
Test χ2 (joint significance) 
Log-pseudolikelihood 
Mean VIF 
N 
96.81*** 
-1035.38 
6.95 
80 
Note 1: *** indicates significance at 1% level; ** indicates significance at 5% level; * indicates 
significance at 10% level. 
Note 2: In parentheses, standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered by provinces 
Source: authors’ own  
 
We find evidence that it is more likely that municipalities cooperate to deliver solid waste 
when the costs of this service are higher. Furthermore, larger and dispersed municipalities tend 
to cooperate less often. Finally, it is more likely that municipalities cooperate when the political 
party of the mayor in the municipality is the same political party that manages the county. The 
variables of fiscal burden and the dummy for right-wing majors are not statistically significant.    
Hence, municipalities may be guided by pragmatic reasons in their decision to cooperate 
with other municipalities in the delivery of the service. Indeed, it seems that this policy option is 
aimed to reduce costs because municipalities that afford higher costs tend to delegate the 
responsibility of the service to the county. On the contrary, related fiscal variables do not seem 
to be influential, consistent with results in LeRoux (2007). Additionally, the ideological variable 
is not statistically significant. In this regard, a clear way for municipalities to save costs by 
choosing cooperation has to do with the exploitation of scale economies. This explains that larger 
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municipalities tend to cooperate less often because they may achieve scale economies by 
themselves, consistent with results in Warner and Hefetz (2002) and Carr, LeRoux and Shrestha 
(2009). Finally, cooperation may be less likely when the supervision of the service is more 
complex (that is, when population of the municipality is more dispersed) and when the 
coordination with the county may be also more complex (when major and the county’s chair are 
from a different political party), all of this is consistent with findings in Shrestha and Feiock 
(2011) on transaction costs and on reciprocal exchange, and results in LeRoux, Brandenburger 
and Pandey (2010) on social networks and cooperation.  
Regarding the estimation of cost equations, total costs increase as the population rises as 
expected.  On the other hand, costs also increase as the population density rises although the 
coefficient associated with this variable is positive and statistically significant only in the 
estimation of equation (2). We also obtain some evidence that total costs are higher as population 
dispersion rises. Furthermore, costs seem to be higher when the distance to the landfill increases 
although the coefficient associated to this variable is positive and statistically significant just in 
the estimation of equation (2).  
Importantly, we find that cooperation may allow municipalities to save costs even when 
controlling for the form of production. Indeed, the dummy variable of cooperation is negative 
and statistically significant in the estimation of equation (2). On the contrary, the dummy variable 
for private production is also negative but not statistically significant.  The test of equal 
parameters between the dummy variables for cooperation and privatization confirms the 
statistical difference in the size of the coefficients associated to these variables. 
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Table 4. Empirical results of the estimation of the determinants of costs  
 Dependent variable: CTE 
– equation (2) 
(Two-stage least squares) 
Dependent variable: CTE – 
equation (3) 
(Ordinary least squares) 
DDelegation -189962. 3 (78194.39)*** - 
Dprivatization -11628.37 (28860.53) - 
Dinter-municipal cooperation - -28492.1 (10110.1)* 
Djoint purchase from the market - -4184.97 (12218.04) 
Din-house production - 131325.8 (122277.2) 
POP 32.64 (2.90)*** 32.12 (5.82)** 
DISP 8582.96 (1698.87)*** 12343.99 (2108.78)** 
DEN 397.34 (108.17)*** 64.53 (27.69) 
DIST 548.45 (234.48)*** -445.16 (908.70) 
CONSTANT 113275.7 (110335.4) -16577.07 (56516.5) 
R2 
Test-F (joint significance) 
Mean VIF 
N 
Test Ddelegation ≠ Dprivatization 
Test Dpublic-cooperate ≠ Dprivate-
cooperate 
 
0.92 
85.11*** 
2.95 
80 
28.74*** 
- 
0.91 
34.54*** 
2.05 
80 
- 
20.03** 
Note 1: *** indicates significance at 1% level; ** indicates significance at 5% level; * indicates 
significance at 10% level. 
Note 2: In parentheses, standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered by provinces  
Source: authors’ own  
 
In equation (3), the coefficient associated to the dummy variable for municipalities that 
cooperate with public production (inter-municipal cooperation) is negative and statistically 
significant at the 10% level. The coefficient associated to the dummy variable for municipalities 
that cooperate with private production (joint purchase from the market) is also negative but not 
statistically significant. The test of equal parameters between the dummy variables for inter-
municipal cooperation and joint purchase from the market confirms the statistical difference in 
the size of the coefficients associated to these variables. Finally, the coefficient associated with 
the dummy variable for municipalities with in-house production is positive but not statistically 
significant. Our results indicate that the delivery choice mode that allows municipalities to save 
a higher amount of costs is public production with cooperation (inter-municipal cooperation).  
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Thus, we find evidence that cooperation is an effective delivery choice mode for saving 
costs in the case of small municipalities. On the contrary, it seems that the form of production 
(public or private) does not have a strong relevant effect on costs. However, we must be cautious 
in the interpretation of the latter result because we do not have enough data to clearly disentangle 
the effect of cooperation and privatization on costs.  
In conclusion, it seems that local governments in small municipalities may obtain further 
cost savings if they decide to co-operate with other municipalities in the provision of this service, 
while the decision to privatize the service or maintain public production seems less relevant in 
terms of costs. 
In municipalities with small populations, there are two factors that may serve to explain why 
costs with private production are not necessarily lower. First, these municipalities may face 
difficulties in meeting the high transaction costs derived from the design and supervision of 
contracts with private companies. Second, it is likely that competition for the contract is not 
strong given the small number of companies that tender for such contracts. In fact, in many cases 
local monopolies may be consolidated in small municipalities (Bel and Fageda, 2011). These 
two factors, transaction costs and the lack of competition, may explain why the variable of 
private production is not statistically significant. 
The other factor that can have a real impact on the potential cost savings of privatization is 
the exploitation of scale economies. Indeed, private companies can aggregate the output 
generated by several municipalities, while the output of the municipality itself (where the 
population is modest) may not be sufficient to minimize costs. However, our results indicate that 
inter-municipal cooperation, which also allows the exploitation of scale economies through the 
aggregation of the output of different municipalities, seems a more effective alternative than 
privatization to reduce costs. The fact that inter-municipal cooperation involves lower 
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transaction costs and is less likely to be affected by competition problems may account for this 
result. Nonetheless, we must note that because we use a small sample from a very specific 
population we cannot claim direct generalization of our results. 
Finally, one interesting issue arising from our results is why 10 municipalities chose not to 
cooperate in spite of the potential benefits derived from cooperation. Two factors may be crucial 
to explain this issue. First, the fact that those municipalities that decided not to delegate to the 
county tend to have larger population, so they might have less to gain from delegating the service 
in order to exploit scale economies. Second, municipalities whose mayor belongs to a different 
political party from that of the county’s chairman are less prone to delegate the service to the 
county, and this might be influential as well, consistent with coordination problems coming from 
different characteristics such as ideology of participating communities (Lowery 2000, Feiock 
2007). After all, cost considerations are not the sole driver of service delivery choices (see, in 
this regard, Bel and Fageda, 2007, 2009). 
5. Conclusion 
This article has examined the decision of small municipalities to cooperate in the delivery of 
residential solid waste services and the impact this decision has on the costs of providing the 
service. We find that the decision to cooperate is a pragmatic choice of municipalities with a 
sub-optimal size: the empirical evidence provides suggests that cooperation leads to lower 
service provision costs.  
Furthermore, we have found that cooperation allows municipalities to save costs once we 
control for the form of production and other factors explaining costs. In this regard, our empirical 
analysis suggests that cooperation may be a more efficient way than privatization to save costs, 
although we must be cautious in the interpretation of this latter result because our data is not rich 
enough to disentangle the effect of privatization and cooperation on costs. The availability of 
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larger samples from a less specific population of cities would be helpful to further analyze this 
issue.  
It should be borne in mind that while there is an extensive empirical literature analyzing 
factors explaining privatization and the impact of privatization on cost savings, few previous 
studies have analyzed the motivations and consequences of the use of inter-municipal 
cooperation. In this way, we have been able to contribute to the literature regarding the analysis 
of the most efficient way of organizing the provision of the service so as to achieve the greatest 
cost savings.  
Our findings would suggest that local governments in small municipalities can obtain greater 
cost savings by opting to cooperate with other municipalities in the provision of the service. 
However, the decision as to whether to outsource the service or to maintain public production 
seems less relevant in terms of costs. This last result is consistent with the most recent empirical 
evidence in the literature. 
The potential cost savings of privatization has to do –among other factors- with the 
exploitation of scale economies. Private companies can aggregate the output generated by 
several municipalities, while the municipal output (where a population is only modest) may not 
be sufficient to minimize costs. However, our results show that inter-municipal cooperation, 
which similarly allows scale economies to be exploited by grouping the output of different 
municipalities, appears to be a more effective alternative than private delivery for reducing costs. 
The explanation for this seems to lie in the fact that inter-municipal cooperation incurs lower 
transaction costs and is less likely to be affected by competition failures. On this point, it is worth 
recalling that our analysis is done for a sample of municipalities of small dimension at a 
particular point of time, which precludes automatically extending our conclusion for all types of 
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municipalities. In fact, large municipalities operate at optimal scale on their own, and could be 
less affected by competition failures when opting for private delivery without cooperation.   
 Our results have interesting implications for public policy. Among them, we think worth 
emphasizing the potential that inter-municipal cooperation appears to offer in realizing 
economies of scale and, thus, in reducing costs. In this regard, policies establishing incentives to 
cooperate within counties where municipalities are of small dimension could help to achieve 
lower costs and improved efficiency. Yet, this potential is not unconditional. Local services need 
to be characterized by the existence of scale economies. Thus, we want to stress that the 
municipalities that cooperate need to have fairly small population thresholds, since larger 
municipalities already tend to be operating at an optimal scale. In this context, if there are 
economies of scale to be exploited and if municipalities are small, cooperation can be well worth 
promoting. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1. Characteristics of the municipalities that cooperate 
Municipality County 
Population 
(number of 
inhabitants 
Distance to the capital of 
the county (kilometers) 
Biescas C. Alto Gallego 1712 15 
Sabiñanigo C. Alto Gallego 10112 0 
Sallent de Gallego C. Alto Gallego 1376 34 
Alcorisa C. Bajo Aragón 3692 37 
Calanda C. Bajo Aragón 3825 22 
Mas de las Matas C. Bajo Aragón 1445 41 
Belver C. Bajo Cinca 1380 24 
Fraga C. Bajo Cinca 14034 0 
Mequinenza C. Bajo Cinca 2478 20 
Albalate del Arzobispo C. Bajo Martín 2233 11 
Hijar C. Bajo Martín 1928 0 
Puebla de Hijar, La C. Bajo Martín 1018 7 
Ainzon C. Campo de Borja 1274 3 
Borja C. Campo de Borja 4838 0 
Fuendejalón C. Campo de Borja 1034 14 
Magallón C. Campo de Borja 1221 9.5 
Mallen C. Campo de Borja 3680 21 
Albalate de Cinca C. Cinca Medio 1179 30 
Binaced C. Cinca Medio 1534 10 
Monzón C. Cinca Medio 16749 0 
Biota C. Cinco Villas 1138 21 
Ejea de los Caballeros C. Cinco Villas 17178 0 
Sádaba C. Cinco Villas 1696 22 
Tauste C. Cinco Villas 7690 28 
Almudévar C. Hoya de Huesca 2449 21 
Ayerbe C. Hoya de Huesca 1126 29 
Gurrea de Gallego C. Hoya de Huesca 1710 39 
Huesca C. Hoya de Huesca 51117 0 
Sotonera, La C. Hoya de Huesca 1058 21 
Altorricón C. La Litera 1491 18 
Binéfar C. La Litera 9288 0 
Tamarite de Litera C. La Litera 3715 12 
Bujaraloz C. Monegros 1048 40 
Grañen C. Monegros 2041 28 
Lalueza C. Monegros 1137 12 
Lanaja C. Monegros 1478 17 
Leciñena C. Monegros 1309 44 
Sariñena C. Monegros 4308 0 
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Tardienta C. Monegros 1043 44 
Alagón C. Ribera Alta del Ebro 6894 0 
Gallur C. Ribera Alta del Ebro 3004 25 
Luceni C. Ribera Alta del Ebro 1080 18 
Pedrola C. Ribera Alta del Ebro 3488 11 
Pinseque C. Ribera Alta del Ebro 3252 6.5 
Remolinos C. Ribera Alta del Ebro 1198 9.5 
Torres de Berrellen C. Ribera Alta del Ebro 1517 10 
Gelsa C. Ribera Baja del Ebro 1207 5 
Pina de Ebro C. Ribera Baja del Ebro 2552 13 
Quinto C. Ribera Baja del Ebro 2101 0 
Almunia de Doña 
Godina C. Valdejalón 7633 0 
Calatorao C. Valdejalón 3024 9.5 
Epila C. Valdejalón 4682 19 
Lumpiaque C. Valdejalón 1053 23 
Morata de Jalón C. Valdejalón 1354 14 
Ricla C. Valdejalón 3400 5 
San Mateo de Gállego Mancomunidad Bajo Gallego 2895 7.5 
Villanueva de Gállego Mancomunidad Bajo Gallego 4101 16 
Zuera Mancomunidad Bajo Gallego 7288 0 
 
Note: We only show counties where more than two municipalities in our sample cooperate in 
the delivery of solid waste 
 
 
 
 
 
